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will refer to the rule in ques-
tion as the “soda container 
rule.”) 
As will be discussed, the 
disagreement over how to 
frame this dispute illustrates 
the nature of the judgment 
the courts have made thus 
far. In determining whether 
the Board of Health has the 
authority to promulgate 
the soda container rule, 
the courts have applied the 
four-factor test set out by 
the Court of Appeals in Boreali v. Axelrod in order to 
draw the “diffi cult-to-demarcate line” between permis-
sible agency rulemaking and impermissible legislat-
ing.5 In making this determination, the courts engage 
in something akin to a gestalt judgment—not only is 
the application of the Boreali factors discretionary, but 
some factors require nothing more than an exercise 
of classifi cation or judgment. Thus far, the petitioners 
have been more successful than the City in persuading 
the courts that their view of the soda container rule—
and of the governing separation of powers principles—
is correct. 
Promulgation of the Rule
The soda container rule was developed by two 
City agencies: the Board of Health and the New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(DOHMH). To understand the authority of the Board 
of Health, it is necessary to fi rst understand the author-
ity of DOHMH. As the First Department summarized: 
“DOHMH is an administrative agency that is charged 
with regulating and supervising all matters affecting 
health in the city, including conditions hazardous to 
life and health, by regulating the food and drug supply 
of the City, and enforcing provisions of the New York 
City Health Code.”6 
The Board of Health “is empowered to amend 
the Health Code with respect to all matters to which 
the power and authority of DOHMH extend.”7 This 
includes Article 81 of the Health Code, which sets out 
the rules regulating City food service establishments 
(FSEs).8
On May 30, 2012, Mayor Michael Bloomberg an-
nounced the soda container rule, a proposed amend-
ment to Article 81 that would require FSEs to cap at 
sixteen ounces the size of cups and containers used 
Among the most 
controversial actions taken 
by a municipality in recent 
years was New York City’s 
(the City) efforts to restrict 
restaurants, movie theaters, 
and other food-service 
establishments from serv-
ing sugary drinks in sizes 
larger than sixteen ounces. 
The City adopted the rule as 
part of its efforts to address 
rising rates of obesity. The 
measure received extensive 
news coverage, drew dueling newspaper editorials, 
and thus far has been blocked by litigation.1
The rule in question has been referred to as the 
“Soda Ban.”2 In fact, it does not ban soda. It only regu-
lates the size of the container in which soda or other 
sugary drinks may be served. The “Portion Cap Rule,” 
as it has been labeled by the City, was adopted by the 
New York City Board of Health (Board of Health) in 
September 2012 and was scheduled to go into effect in 
March 2013. 
Before that occurred, however, the rule was chal-
lenged in court. In 2013, the New York County Su-
preme Court held that the rule was not valid, and this 
decision was affi rmed by the First Department of the 
Appellate Division.3 As detailed below, both courts 
essentially held that the Board of Health did not have 
the authority to adopt the rule and therefore violated 
separation of powers doctrine in doing so. 
As this article went to press, the City was pursu-
ing an appeal of the First Department’s decision in the 
Court of Appeals.4 This article discusses the litigation 
over the City’s efforts to restrict the size of sugary 
drink containers. It provides a history of the rule, from 
its promulgation by the Board of Health to the Appel-
late Division’s decision invalidating the rule. 
The article also comments on the dispute between 
the parties over how to frame the rule. Opponents of 
the rule, including the parties who fi led suit to block 
the rule, characterize the measure as an unwarranted 
and unprecedented incursion of consumer choice and 
personal freedom. They decry the “Soda Ban.” On the 
other hand, proponents of the “Portion Cap Rule,” 
including the City, view the rule as a modest measure 
intended to address obesity, a signifi cant—even alarm-
ing—public health issue. (For the rest of this article, we 
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invalidate the soda container rule.16 The petitioners 
claimed that the Board’s adoption of the Portion Cap 
Rule usurped the role of the City Council and imposed 
social policy by executive fi at, contending that the 
Board “may not bypass the legislature, under the guise 
of public health, and make fundamental policy choices 
and establish far-reaching new policy programs all by 
themselves, no matter how well-intentioned they may 
be.”17 
The Supreme Court declared the regulation in-
valid, primarily on the ground that the Board of Health 
exceeded its authority and violated the separation of 
powers doctrine set out in Boreali v. Axelrod.18 It also 
found that the rule itself was arbitrary and capricious.19 
The First Department’s Decision—Boreali as a 
Controlling Case
The principal issue on appeal was whether the 
Board of Health exceeded the bounds of its authority 
as an administrative agency when it promulgated the 
soda container rule. The First Department held that the 
Board of Health exceeded the bounds of its lawfully 
delegated authority as an administrative agency when 
it promulgated the rule and therefore affi rmed the 
Supreme Court decision.20
The court fi rst pointed out that the starting point 
for analyzing whether the rule violates the separation 
of powers doctrine is the New York State Court of Ap-
peals’ landmark decision in Boreali v. Axelrod.21 Boreali 
depended upon and articulated a type of delegation 
doctrine. A state administrative agency not only is a 
creature of the legislature, it also “may not, in the ex-
ercise of rulemaking authority, engage in broad-based 
policy determinations.”22 The court acknowledged that 
the line between permissible rulemaking authority 
and impermissible policy determination is “diffi cult to 
demarcate.”23
In Boreali, which involved regulations promulgated 
by the Public Health Council (PHC), the Court relied 
on four factors to determine whether an agency acted 
beyond the bounds of its delegated authority and en-
gaged in impermissible legislative policymaking: 
First, the Court found that the PHC 
had engaged in the balancing of 
competing concerns of public health 
and economic costs, “acting solely on 
its own ideas of sound public policy.” 
Second, the PHC did not engage in 
the “interstitial” rule making typi-
cal of administrative agencies, but 
had instead written “on a clean slate, 
creating its own comprehensive set 
of rules without benefi t of legislative 
guidance.” Third, the PHC’s regula-
tions concerned “an area in which the 
legislature had repeatedly tried—and 
to serve sugary beverages. The stated purpose of the 
rule was to address rising obesity rates in the City. 
In a news article about the announcement, Mayor 
Bloomberg said, “Obesity is a nationwide problem, 
and all over the United States, public health offi cials 
are wringing their hands saying, ‘Oh, this is terrible.’” 
He added, “New York City is not about wringing your 
hands; it’s about doing something.”9
A day later, “14 members of the City Council 
wrote to the Mayor opposing the [proposed rule] and 
insisting that, at the very least, it should be put before 
the Council for a vote.”10 However, the proposed soda 
container rule never was put before the City Council 
for a vote.
Instead, DOHMH presented the proposed amend-
ment to the Board of Health in June 2012 and a public 
hearing on the soda container rule was held on July 
24, 2012. According to the First Department: “Of more 
than 38,000 written comments received prior to the 
public hearing, approximately 32,000 (84 percent) 
supported the proposal and approximately 6,000 (16 
percent) opposed it. In addition, New Yorkers for 
Beverage Choice submitted a petition opposing the 
proposal, signed by more than 90,000 people.”11
The DOHMH made no changes to the initial pro-
posal submitted to the public. Instead, the DOHMH 
provided the Board with a memorandum summariz-
ing and responding to the written comments. In the 
memorandum, the DOHMH pointed out that “the 
scientifi c evidence supporting associations between 
sugary drinks, obesity, and other negative health con-
sequences is compelling.”12
The DOHMH also noted that the proposed rule 
would have a “material impact” on consumption of 
sugary drinks because “patterns of human behavior 
indicate that consumers gravitate toward the default 
option.” Thus, the DOHMH concluded, “if the pro-
posal is adopted, customers intent upon consuming 
more than 16 ounces would have to make a conscious 
decision to do so.”13 In response “to the critics’ asser-
tion that the rule would result in economic hardship 
for certain businesses, the agency responded that the 
freedom to sell large sugary drinks ‘means little com-
pared to the necessity to protect New Yorkers from the 
obesity epidemic.’”14
On September 13, 2012, the Board of Health 
voted to adopt the rule, and a “Notice of Adoption of 
Amendment (§ 81.53) to Article 81 of the Health Code” 
was published in the City Record. The rule was sched-
uled to go into effect on March 12, 2013.15
Litigation in the Supreme Court 
Before the rule went into effect, it was challenged 
by a number of groups who brought an action in 
the Supreme Court of New York County seeking to 
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The First Department found that the fi rst Boreali 
factor was satisfi ed in this case. The DOHMH and 
the Board members themselves indicated that they 
weighed the potential benefi ts against economic fac-
tors during the public comment period and public 
hearings.32 Just as in Boreali, the exemptions and excep-
tions to the soda container rule also evince a compro-
mise of social and economic concerns as well as private 
interests, the First Department held.33 The rule does 
not apply to all FSEs, nor does it apply to all sugary 
beverages.34
The court also found that the soda container rule 
“looks beyond health concerns, in that it manipulates 
choices to try to change consumer norms.”35 In es-
sence, the rule was inherently a policy decision that 
refl ected a balance between health concerns, an indi-
vidual consumer’s choice of diet, and business fi nan-
cial interests in providing the targeted sugary drinks.36 
Such a policy decision is suited for legislative determi-
nations, the court stated, because it involves “diffi cult 
social problems” that must be resolved by “making 
choices among competing ends.”37 In sum, the court 
held that the fi rst Boreali factor was met because the 
selective restrictions enacted by the Board of Health 
reveal that the health of New York City residents was 
not its sole concern.38
The second Boreali factor—whether the Board of 
Health exceeded its authority by writing on “a clean 
slate” rather than using its regulatory power to fi ll in 
the details of a legislative scheme—was also met in 
the soda container case. Administrative agencies may 
engage in what is known at “interstitial rule making,” 
or the process of fi lling in the details of a broad legisla-
tive mandate and making that legislation operational.39 
An agency exceeds the limits of its authority when the 
agency’s action goes beyond fi lling in the details of a 
broad legislative scheme.40
In Boreali, there was no legislation authorizing the 
PHC to regulate smoking in public places. Thus, the 
PHC “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own compre-
hensive set of rules without the benefi t of legislative 
guidance.”41 Similarly, the First Department found that 
in the soda container case the Board’s actions did not 
constitute the type of interstitial rule making described 
in Boreali. Here, the Board of Health did not fi ll in the 
gaps of an already existing legislative scheme, but in-
stead wrote on a clean slate. In the First Department’s 
view, the Board’s actions were not the sort of intersti-
tial rule making that typifi es administrative regulatory 
activity.42
The Board of Health insisted that it possessed 
the authority to act, citing the City Charter’s grant of 
broad authority to regulate “all matters affecting health 
in the City.”43 The court held that although the Board’s 
power is broad in scope, the City Charter did not au-
thorize the Board’s actions.44 Such an exercise of power 
failed—to reach an agreement in the 
face of substantial public debate and 
vigorous lobbying by a variety of 
interested factions.” The separation of 
powers principles mandate that elect-
ed legislators, rather than appointed 
administrators “resolve diffi cult social 
problems by making choices among 
competing ends.” Fourth, the PHC 
had overstepped its bounds because 
the development of the regulations 
did not require expertise in the fi eld of 
health.24 
The First Department also relied on Matter of 
Campagna v. Shaffer, in which the Court of Appeals 
explained that “[a] key feature of the Boreali case…
was that the Legislature had never articulated a 
policy regarding public smoking.”25 According to the 
First Department, subsequent to Boreali, “courts have 
consistently held that so long as an action taken by an 
administrative agency is consistent with the policies 
contemplated by the Legislature, the action taken will 
survive constitutional scrutiny under the doctrine of 
separation of powers.”26
The First Department’s Decision—Applying 
Boreali
The First Department noted that the Board of 
Health, although delegated a broad range of powers 
that are essentially legislative in nature, has no inher-
ent legislative power.27 Accordingly, the court stated, 
the Board derives its power to establish rules and regu-
lations directly and solely from the City Council. The 
court then went on to assess the factors enunciated in 
Boreali. In doing so, it found that all four Boreali factors 
indicative of the usurpation of legitimate legislative 
functions are present in this case.28 A brief summary of 
the analysis of each factor follows.
The fi rst Boreali factor is whether the agency has 
balanced competing concerns of public health and 
economic costs. In Boreali, the court found that the 
PHC’s inclusion of exceptions and exemptions that 
refl ected the agency’s own balancing of economic 
and social implications of the regulations was clear 
evidence that the regulatory scheme was inconsistent 
with the agency’s legislative authority.29 The PHC had 
exempted certain establishments, such as bars and 
certain restaurants, from the indoor smoking bans. 
According to the court, this effort to “strike the proper 
balance among health concerns, costs and privacy 
interests…is a uniquely legislative function.”30 In 
Boreali, the presence of exemptions was telling because 
such exemptions did not refl ect the agency’s charge to 
protect public health but instead refl ected the agency’s 
own policy decisions with respect to the balance be-
tween protecting public health and ensuring economic 
viability of certain industries.31 
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broad legislative grant of authority to develop a “sim-
ple code” that banned indoor smoking and exempted 
certain groups.58 The Boreali court found that no techni-
cal competence or agency expertise was necessary to 
develop this code.59 This indicated to the court that the 
agency had engaged in unauthorized policy-making 
rather than interstitial rulemaking.60
In the soda container case, the court found that the 
Board of Health did not exercise any special expertise 
or technical competence in developing the soda con-
tainer rule.61 Rather, the rule was drafted and proposed 
by the Offi ce of the Mayor and submitted to the Board, 
which enacted it without making any substantive 
changes.62 This factor, although less compelling than 
the others, also weighed in favor of invalidating the 
rule, according to the First Department.63
After applying the four-factor test set forth in Bo-
reali, the court concluded that the Board of Health had 
overstepped the boundaries of its authority by violat-
ing the state principle of separation of powers. The 
court did not address the argument that the regulation 
was arbitrary and capricious.64
Framing the Dispute in the Appellate Division
The litigation over the soda container rule has 
involved a number of disputes over how to frame the 
controversy. As an initial matter, as noted earlier, the 
petitioners referred to the rule in their brief before the 
First Department as “the Ban”65—a term that sug-
gests an authoritarian edict that deprives consumers 
of certain beverages. It frames the dispute as a zero-
sum contest in which the Board of Health undeniably 
denies consumers the opportunity to purchase soda. 
The City, by contrast, defends what it calls “the Portion 
Cap Rule”—a phrase that is meant to be neutral and 
scientifi c and indicates an effort to clothe the rule in the 
garb of scientifi c expertise. There is no explicit mention 
of soda or sugar and no suggestion that consumers are 
being deprived of choices. In determining whether the 
Board has engaged in the broader task of policymak-
ing or the more limited act of interstitial rulemaking, it 
surely makes a difference in how the Board’s rule is de-
fi ned and described. The Soda Ban suggests the former 
while the Portion Cap Rule connotes the latter. 
In their briefs before the First Department, the par-
ties also engaged in a framing dispute over the extent 
to which the case involved an abstract question of law 
or a practical matter of policymaking. The petitioners 
adopted a formalistic approach, insisting that there 
should be no discussion of science or policy unless the 
Board of Health, as a threshold matter, possesses the 
authority to adopt the soda container rule. The pre-
liminary statement of their brief begins: “This case is 
not about obesity in New York City of soft drinks. It is 
about whether the Mayor and his Board of Health can 
usurp the authority of the City Council and decide for 
would be an “unfettered delegation of legislative 
power.”45 In addition, the First Department stated the 
City Charter provides that the Board of Health may 
exercise its power to modify the health code as long as 
it is “not inconsistent with the constitution,” or with 
the laws of the state and the City Charter.46 The court 
held that the City Charter’s Enabling Act, granting the 
Board of Health explicit power to establish, amend, 
and repeal the Health Code, was clearly intended by 
the legislature to provide the agency with the discre-
tion to engage in interstitial rule making designed to 
protect the public from health hazards.47 Thus, the 
court found that because Board of Health did not des-
ignate soda consumption as a health hazard per se, the 
Board of Health’s action in curtailing its consumption 
was not the type of interstitial rule making intended 
by the legislature.48
The third Boreali factor focused on the fact that 
the legislature had repeatedly tried to pass legislation 
implementing indoor smoking bans, yet had failed 
to do so.49 In the Boreali court’s view, this refl ected 
the legislature’s inability to agree on the “goals and 
methods that should govern in resolving” the issue.50 
There, the agency’s attempt to impose a solution of its 
own was improper. The court also distinguished the 
case of failed legislative action from mere inaction, 
holding that mere legislative inaction on a particular 
issue should not satisfy this factor.51
With respect to the soda container rule, the First 
Department noted that both the City and State leg-
islatures have unsuccessfully attempted “to target 
sugar-sweetened beverages.”52 The City Council 
rejected several resolutions such as warning labels, 
prohibiting food stamp use for purchase, and taxes on 
such beverages.53 The State Assembly has introduced, 
but not yet passed, bills prohibiting the sale of sugary 
drinks on government property and prohibiting stores 
with ten or more employees from displaying candy or 
sugary drinks at the check-out counter or aisle.54 The 
court found that although the rule employed different 
means of targeting sugary beverages, it nevertheless 
pursued the same end and thus addressed the same 
policy area in which measures had been rejected by 
both the State and City legislatures.55 According to the 
Court this was a strong indication that the legislature 
remains unsure of how best to approach the issue of 
sugary beverage consumption.56 The First Department 
concluded that the legislature’s inaction demonstrated 
that the legislature had been unable to reach an agree-
ment on the goals and methods that should govern in 
resolving a society-wide health problem.57
The fi nal Boreali factor in determining whether an 
administrative agency has exceeded the bounds of its 
legislative authority is whether any special expertise 
or technical competence was involved in the develop-
ment of the regulation. In Boreali, the PHC used its 
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all FSEs within New York City, and defi ned ‘sugary drink’ as 
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sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment with sugar 
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ban applies to restaurants, delis, fast-food franchises, movies 
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convenience stores, corner markets, gas sta tions and other 
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themselves what the law should be.”66 For the peti-
tioners, the dispute was one that should be resolved 
within the confi nes of black letter law.
The City, by contrast, sought to persuade the court 
that obesity is a crisis that demands governmental 
action. The preliminary statement of the City’s brief 
states: “The Portion Cap Rule regulates how business-
es serve a product whose overconsumption is driving 
an epidemic.”67 Before addressing the legal issues 
raised by the petitioners, the City devoted nearly two 
pages of its preliminary statement to describing the ex-
tent of the obesity “health crisis” and the role of sugar 
and soda in causing obesity; it then explained how 
the soda container rule “is a measured response” to 
that crisis.68 Confronted with such an alarming health 
concern, the brief suggests, surely the Board of Health 
has the authority to act—especially when its actions 
are modest and supported by suffi cient data. 
The last framing dispute has been, thus far, the 
most consequential. And that dispute is over the 
authority invested in the Board of Health. Is the Board 
wrongly claiming, as the petitioners insist, that it is 
“unique among all State and City agencies” and there-
fore “not bound by constitutional limitations imposed 
by the separation of powers”?69 Or is the City correct 
in asserting that the Board is not “typical” and in fact 
“is empowered to issue substantive rules and stan-
dards in public health matters,” with the authority to 
protect “the health of New Yorkers from chronic and 
preventable diseases and conditions”?70 Thus far, the 
petitioners have persuaded the courts to accept their 
view of the Board’s authority. 
The First Department acknowledged that the New 
York City Charter “explicitly grants” the Board of 
Health “the power to supervise and regulate the safety 
of the water and food supplies” in order to address 
“inherently harmful matters,” but found that mere 
“soda consumption” did not constitute such a “health 
hazard.”71 Rather, the court stated, “the hazard arises 
from the consumption of sugary soda in ‘excess quan-
tity.’”72 Therefore, the First Department reasoned, the 
Board’s “action in curtailing its consumption was not 
the kind of interstitial rulemaking” permitted under 
Boreali. This discussion accords with how the petition-
ers have framed the dispute.
However, if it is accepted that obesity is a crisis 
that results, in large part, from the consumption of 
sugary soda in excess quantities—that is, if excessive 
soda consumption is found to be a “health hazard”—
and it is accepted that the soda container rule does not 
ban the consumption of soda but only regulates how it 
may be sold to consumers, then isn’t the soda con-
tainer rule the sort of interstitial rulemaking allowed 
under Boreali? The answer depends, it would seem, on 
how the rule is framed by the parties and, ultimately, 
by the Court of Appeals. 
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